Monday, July 14th, 2003
 

09:00 - 09:10    Opening
Chair:                 Marek Karpinski

9:10 -  9:40        Nikhil R. Devanur (Georgia Institute of Technology)
                            Market Equilibrium: Algorithms for the Linear Case
9:40 - 10:10       Vijay Vazirani (Georgia Institute of Technology
                            Market Equilibrium when Buyers have Spending Constraints
10:10 - 10:40     Steven Low (CalTech - Pasadena)
                           Duality and Stability Models of Internet Congestion Control

Coffee break

Chair:                 Vijay Vazirani

11:00 - 11:30    Daniel Lehmann (University of Jerusalem)
                          Equilibria in Exchange Economies
11:30 - 12:00    Rudolf Müller (Maastricht University)
                           On the Complexity of Auctions

12:15                  Lunch break

Chair:                 Daniel Lehmann

15:00 - 15:30    Yoav Shoham (Stanford)
                           On the non-comparable paranoias of game theory and cryptography
15:30 - 16:00     Subhash Suri (University of Jerusalem)
                           Nash Equilibrium Load Balancing

16:00 - 16:30    Coffee break

Chair:                 Mark Jerrum

16:30 - 17:00    Rahul Sami (Yale University)
                          Computation in a Distributed Information Market
17:00 - 17:30    Artur Czumaj (New Jersey Inst. of Technology)
                          Worst-Case Equilibria for Server Farms

18:00                  Dinner
 

Tuesday, July 15th, 2003
 

Chair:                 Martin Dyer

09:00 - 09:30    Christos Papadimitriou (Berkeley)
                           Nash Equilibria and Complexity.
09:30 - 10:00    Milena Mihail (Georgia Institute of Technologie)
                           Algorithmic Performance on Lower Law Graphs
10:00 - 10:30    Elias Koutsoupias (University of California at Los Angeles)
                           Coordination Mechanisms

10:30 - 11:00    Coffee break

Chair:                 Michael Paterson

11:00 - 11:30    Rica Gonen (University of Jerusalem)
                           IncertiveCompatible Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
11:30 - 12:00    Piotr Krysta (MPI fuer Informatik)
                           Computing Equilibria for Congestion Games

12:15                  Lunch break

Chair:                 Elias Koutsoupias

15:00 - 15:30    Jason Hartline (University of Washington)
                           Profit Maximizing Envy-Free Auctions
15:30 - 16:00    Bernhard von Stengel (London School of Economics)
                           Hard-To-Solve Bimatrix Games

16:00 - 16:30    Coffee break

Chair:                 Leonard J. Schulman

16:30 - 17:00    Amitabh Sinha (CMU - Pittsburgh)
                           Min-max Payoffs of a Location Game
17:00 - 17:30    Aaron Archer (Cornell University)
                          Approximate Truthful Mechanisms for a Combinatorial Auction

18:00                  Dinner
 

Wednesday July 16th, 2003
 

Chair:                 Noam Nisan

09:00 - 09:30    Eva Tardos (Cornell University)
                           Network Design Games
09:30 - 10:00    Amir Ronen (Technion - Haifa)
                           Optimal Auctions - A Theorectical Computer Science-based Approach
10:00 - 10:30    Tim Roughgarden (Cornell University)
                           Pricing Networks with Selfish Routing

10:30 - 11:30    Coffee break

Chair:                 Eva Tardos

11:30 - 12:00    Sven de Vries (TU Muenchen)
                           On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects

12:15                  Lunch break

13:30 - 17:30     Excursion

18:00                   Dinner

20:00                   Evening Session

Chair:                  Vijay Vazirani
 

Thursday July 17th, 2003
 

Chair:                 Christos Papadimitriou

09:00 - 09:30    Noam Nisan (University of Jerusalem)
                           Characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions I :
                           Are there non-VCG mechanisms ?
09:30 - 10:00    Ahuva Mu'alem (University of Jerusalem)
                           Characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions II:
                           Truthfullnes, monotonicity, and IIA
10:00 - 10:30    Ron Lavi (University of Jerusalem)
                           Characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions III:
                           Proof of main theorem

10:30 - 11:00    Coffee break

Chair:                 Rica Gonen

11:00 - 11:30    Leonard J. Schulman (Caltech)
                           Router Congestion Control
11:30 - 12:00    Eric Friedman (Cornell University)
                           Fairness and Stability of Sharing Protocols for the Unlicensed Bands

12:15                  Lunch break

Chair:                 Sven de Vries

15:00 - 15:30    Meir Bing (University of Jerusalem)
                          Representing Substitutes Valuation
15:30 - 16:00    Anupam Gupta (Carnegie Mellon University)
                           Approximation Algorithms via Cost Sharing

16:00                  Coffee

18:00                  Dinner
 

Friday July 18th, 2003
 

Chair:                Miklos Santha

09:00 - 09:30    Michel de Rougemont (Universite Paris Sud)
                           Definable Strategies in Games
09:30 - 10:00    Petra Berenbrink (Simon Fraser University)
                           Utilitarian Resource Assignment

10:30                  Coffee

12:15                  Lunch
 

END OF WORKSHOP